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How Common-Sense Psychology Can
Inform Law and Psycholegal Research
RICHARD E. REDDINGt
I. Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the legal system has seen a variety of
psycholegal research studies and advocacy efforts aimed at informing the law
about legally relevant psychological issues.' Cognitive psychologists have
examined the accuracy of eyewitness testimony,2 social psychologists have
studied jury decision-making, 3 forensic psychologists have examined predictions
of dangerousness and competency to stand trial,4 and developmental psy-
t. Richard E. Redding is Assistant Professor of Law, General Faculty, and of
Psychology at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy at the University of
Virginia. He clerked for the Honorable Michael W. Farrell at the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, his J.D. from
Washington and Lee University, his M.S. from Vanderbilt University, and his B.A. from
Hampden-Sydney College. He would like to thank John Monahan, N. Dickon Reppucci,
and Melvin Wilson for helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
1. Patrick H. DeLeon, et al, How to Influence Public Policy: A Blueprint for Activ-
ism, 37 Am Psychologist 476 (1982); Raymond P. Lotion, et al, eds, Psychology and
Public Policy: Balancing Public Service and Professional Need (Am Psych Assn 1996);
Gary B. Melton, Guidelines for Effective Diffusion of Child Development Research Into
the Legal System, in Gary B. Melton, ed, Reforming the Law: Impact of Child Develop-
ment Research 280 (Guilford 1987); D.D. Perkins, The Use of Social Science in Public In-
terest Litigation: A Role for Community Psychologists, 16 Am J Community Psychol 465
(1988); April Wursten and Bruce Sales, Community Psychologists in State Legislative
Decision Making, 16 Am J Community Psychol 487 (1988).
2. See Brian L. Cutler and Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identifications: The Eye-
witness, Psychology, and the Law (Cambridge 1995).
3. See J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 Ind L J 137 (1990).
4. See Graham Davies, et al, eds, Psychology, Law and Criminal Justice: International
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chologists have examined children's competency and the accuracy of children's
testimony.s Psycholegal researchers have been involved in public interest
litigation,6 legislative decision-making,7 criminal justice interventions,8 and
United States Supreme Court advocacy. The American Psychological Associa-
tion ("APA") has submitted amicus curiae briefs on a wide variety of issues,
including adolescent competence to consent to abortion9 and special procedur-
al protections for child witnesses testifying against their alleged abuser." The
APA has also been an advocate in state trial and appellate courts, as have
professional organizations like the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry and the National Association of Social Workers."
While the impact of social science on law at times is substantial and
occasionally even decisive, 2 relevant research often is ignored or dismissed as
irrelevant to the legal question. 3 One example is research and a book by the
Society for Research in Child Development on children's competence in legal
contexts. 4 The need to determine a child's psychological competence to pro-
vide legally valid consent provides an ideal opportunity for social science to
Developments in Research and Practice (de Gruyter 1996).
5. See Jennifer L. Woolard, N. Dickon Reppucci, and Richard E. Redding, Theoretical
and Methodological Issues in Studying Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 L &
Human Beh 219 (1997).
6. See DeLeon, 37 Am Psychologist 476 (cited in note 1); Perkins, 16 Am J Com-
munity Psychol 465 (cited in note 1).
7. See Wursten and Sales, 16 Am J Community Psychol (cited in note 1).
8. Ronald Roesch, Creating Change in the Legal System: Contributions from Commu-
nity Psychology, 19 L & Human Beh 325 (1995).
9. See Gary B. Melton and Nancy Felipe Russo, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological
Perspectives on Public Policy, 42 Am Psychologist 69 (1987).
10. See G.S. Goodman, et al, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The
American Psychological Association Brief in Maryland v. Craig, 15 L & Human Beh 13
(1991).
11. See Charlotte J. Patterson and Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with
Children: Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52 J Soc Issue 29 (1996).
12. See, for example, Ballew v Georgia, 435 US 223, 239 (1978); Maryland v Craig,
110 S Ct 3157, 3161 (1986).
13. See, for example, Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 168-173 (1986); McClesky v
Kemp, 107 S Ct 1756, 1760-64 (1987); Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 609-13 (1979). It
may be too much to expect that research will have direct and immediate effects on public
policy. Rather, what may be important is that the research has an impact in shaping
policy debates generally. See Victor G. Rosenblum, On Law's Responsiveness to Social
Scientists' Findings: An Intelligible Nexus, 2 Psychol Pub Pol & L 620, 633 (1996)
("whether social scientists' findings or opinions have entered and been accorded due
considerations in law's marketplace of ideas should serve as the principal test of impact");
Carol H. Weiss, The Diffusion of Social Science Research to Policymakers: An Overview
in Melton, ed, Reforming 71-73 (cited in note 1) (arguing particular research findings have
little impact but that research shapes policy views through an incremental process of
"knowledge creep").
14. Gary B. Melton, Gerald P. Koocher, and Michael J. Saks, eds, Children's Com-
petence to Consent (Plenum 1983).
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shape legal policy. Nevertheless, the book's impact on law was "less than
overwhelming" as measured by its frequency of citation in legal opinions."5
Other examples are found in recent court cases in which "a great deal of
expert testimony and scientific data was presented to counter myths about
homosexuality, [and] courts still have found reasons to doubt the credibility of
this evidence.""6 Finally, examples of disregarded social science research
abound in the 92 trial procedure cases decided by the Supreme Court between
1977 and 1988 in which directly relevant social science research was brought
to the Court's attention. Despite over 70 studies of mock juror behavior and
over 120 books and articles on the psychology of trial practice, only one
majority opinion relied on the research.17 In 12 recent cases where there was
strong scientific evidence on trial procedure, the Court decided 10 cases
directly contrary to that evidence and indicated in the other two that it was
not relying on the research in its holding. 8
Thus, efforts to influence law by presenting research findings to courts
have not been widely successful, at least not as successful as social scientists
had hoped. 9 Though social science has had a significant impact on legal
scholarship,2" "scholars have noticed that courts seem particularly averse to
15. Thomas L. Hafemeister and Gary B. Melton, The Impact of Social Science Re-
search on the Judiciary, in Melton, ed, Reforming 27, 49 (cited in note 1).
16. Paula A. Brantner, When Mommy or Daddy is Gay: Developing Constitutional
Standards for Custody Decisions, 3 Hastings Women's L J 97, 109 (1992).
17. Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 142 (cited in note 3).
18. Id.
19. Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's
Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 Vill L Rev 1569 (1992);
Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic
Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 S Meth U
L Rev 329 (1992); Donald N. Bersoff and David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Su-
preme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable
279 (1995); Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual
Jurisprudence, 4 L & Human Beh 147 (1980); Gary B. Melton, Family and Mental
Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in N. Dickon Reppucci, et al, eds,
Children, Mental Health, and the Law 151 (Sage 1984); Gary B. Melton, The Clashing
of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 Am Psychologist 345 (1987); Michael
J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 Am Psychologist 1110 (1989); Michael
J. Saks and Charles H. Baron, eds, The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in
the Courts (Abt 1980); Geoffrey M. Stephenson, Looking to the Future: A Psychologist's
Comment on Richard Albel's Contested Communities, 22 J L & Society 133, 136-37
(1995); Tanford, 66 Ind L J 137 (cited in note 3). But see Murray Levine and Barbara
Howe, The Penetration of Social Science into Legal Culture, 7 L & Pol 173 (1985).
20. See John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating,
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U Pa L Rev 477 (1986); John Monahan and
Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials (Foundation 4th ed 1998).
See also Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for "Law-And" Scholarship, 21 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 158, 159-63 (1997) (providing data on citation rates of psychology journals
showing substantially increased citation in law journal articles between 1982-84 and 1994-
96 for Law and Human Behavior (26% increase) and Psychological Review (49% in-
crease), with Law and Human Behavior ranked 18 in citation impact).
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social science, displaying hostility toward it . . . and rejecting science as no
more reliable than intuition."21 When research findings are cited in court
opinions, they may only serve as a makeweight for the desired result.22
Although it has been written that "judicial decision-making represents social
science in action,"23 that decision-making often seems somewhat impervious
to psychological research.24
This Article outlines specific research, methodological, and legal advocacy
implications of a "common-sense psychology" approach to psycholegal research
and advocacy. Advocates of an empirically grounded jurisprudence call for
"social science in law,"2" but the thesis of this Article is that psycholegal
researchers must also use "law in social science," by considering the common-
sense psychology ("CS-psychology")-the lay knowledge of human behav-
ior-inherent in law. Much of law is a codification of various CS-psychologies,
and social science research typically will be ignored when it fails to take into
account the CS-psychology already embodied in law. The use of CS-psychology
in psycholegal research and advocacy should improve the prospects for
psycholegal research to influence law. As discussed in this Article, CS-psycholo-
gy is a valid source of empirical data that provides fertile ground for conceptu-
alizing, evaluating, and using psycholegal research. First, it is instructive to
review briefly the troubled relationship between law and psycholegal research.
21. Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 151 (cited in note 3). See also Scott Sleek, Is Psychologists'
Testimony Going Unheard?, APA Monitor 29:2 at 1, 34 (Feb 1998).
22. See Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Some Limits on the Applications of Social Science Re-
search in the Legal Process, L & Soc Order 815 (1973).
23. John Minor Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judi-
cial Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 L & Contemp Probs 134,
148 (1975).
24. This Article focuses on social science research evidence. However, the law is often
equally (if not more) skeptical of expert testimony providing clinical opinion, as illustrated
by the following proposed amendment to a New Mexico Senate bill on licensing require-
ments for psychiatrists and psychologists:
When a psychologist or psychiatrist testifies during a defendant's competency
hearing, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall wear a cone-shaped hat that is not less
than two feet tall. The surface of the hat shall be imprinted with stars and lightning
bolts. Additionally, a psychologist or psychiatrist shall be required to don a white
beard that is not less than eighteen inches in length, and shall punctuate crucial
elements of his testimony by stabbing the air with a wand. Whenever a psychologist
or psychiatrist provides expert testimony regarding the defendant's competency, the
bailiff shall dim the courtroom lights and administer two strikes to a Chinese gong.
S Floor Amend 1 to SB 459, 42d Leg, 1st Sess (NM 1995), cited in Scott E. Sundby, The
Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay
Testimony, 83 Va L Rev 1109 (1997).
25. See Gary B. Melton, Law, Science, and Humanity: The Normative Foundation of
Social Science in Law, 14 L & Human Beh 315 (1990); Monahan and Walker, 134 U Pa
L Rev 477 (cited in note 20).
[S:107
Common-Sense Psychology 111
II. The "Conflict-Ridden Ambivalent Affair" Between Law and
Psychology
"Statistics are an elusive thing at best, and it is a truism that almost
anything can be proved by them."2
Science and law are rather different cultures with somewhat incompatible
mores and modes of reasoning,27 so it is not surprising that the relationship
between law and psychology has been described as a "highly neurotic, conflict-
ridden ambivalent affair."2" Yet, since the first use of "social science"'. by
the Supreme Court in Muller v Oregon," social scientists and lawyers alike
have found that social science is useful in legal decision-making. A prominent
law professor of the time went so far as to assert that judges would come to
rely on social science.31 Yale Law School, gaining distinction for its "scientific
investigation" of the law, undertook ambitious empirical studies of how the
law works and what kind of effects it has. Dean Charles Clark conducted a
large five-year study on court procedures, with the results refuting the common
wisdom that the courts were logjammed with long trials and procedural
delays.32 From the very beginning of law's relationship with social science,
segments of the legal community resisted social science research; when faced
with the counterintuitive findings of Clark's study, prominent legal scholars
criticized the social science approach, particularly the reliance on "mass
statistics." 3 Judge Learned Hand said he was "silent before the authority of
26. Maxwell v Bishop, 257 F Supp 710, 720 (E D Ark 1966).
27. See, for example, Steven Goldberg, Culture Clash: Law and Science in America
(NYU 1994); Haney, 4 L & Human Beh 147 (cited in note 19); Nancy Levit, Listening
to the Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 Ford L Rev 263
(1989); Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77
Judicature 77, 82 (1993); Lee Loevinger, Law and Science as Rival Systems, 19 U Fla L
Rev 530 (1967); Rosenblum, 2 Psychol Pub Poli & L 620 (cited in note 13); Peter H.
Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 Yale L & Pol Rev 1
(1993). See also E. Amsel, R. Langer, and L. Loutzenhiser, Do Lawyers Reason Differently
From Psychologists? A Comparative Design for Studying Expertise, in Robert J. Sternberg
and Peter A. Frensch, eds, Complex Problem Solving: Principles and Mechanisms 223,
245-47 (Erlbaum 1991) (summarizing results of two studies comparing the reasoning of
lawyers and psychologists, finding that they reason differently about data and evidence:
lawyers tend to reason counterfactually by comparing cases and events, psychologists
statistically according to covariance).
28. Donald N. Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System: Broader Perspectives, 10
L & Human Beh 151, 155 (1986).
29. The social science cited in the case was not systematic empirical research but
popular media surveys of public opinion.
30. 208 US 412 (1908).
31. See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science 66
(North Carolina 1998) (noting laws are devices for regulating human behavior).
32. Id at 81-146; see also John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 Buff L Rev 459 (1979).
33. Schlegel, American Legal Realism at 81-146 (cited in note 31). Ironically, a
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statisticians, those modern magicians, who would enslave us all." 4 Despite
the study's tremendous scope, examining 70,000 criminal cases in 13 federal
district courts across the country, Harvard Professor and future Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter declared it useless.3s "[T]he fact that Clark's fact
gathering was a scientific enterprise made no difference . . . . [F]act gathering
that did not fit their model of how the world was structured was 'an irrele-
vant jumble of figures.'36
Oliver Wendell Holmes's prediction that "the black letter [sic] man may be
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics"37
did not come to pass, and the problem illustrated by the reaction to Clark's
study continues today. When confronted with research that conflicts with
common-sense assumptions, lawyers and judges frequently reject the empirical
evidence. In fact, they often may consider social science research "no more
reliable than their own intuition and experience. ' For example, the Supreme
Court announced that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is
a dubious business." 9 Justice Powell compared social science to the super-
natural, commenting that the Court should avoid "heavy reliance on numerolo-
gy derived from statistical studies."4" Justice Thomas commented that social
science evidence can be "unnecessary and misleading."41 Justice Breyer opined
that there are social scientists on each side of every issue.
4 2
Suspicions about the validity and reliability of social science research are
also evident in the results from a recent multistate survey of 163 state trial
and appellate court judges and 220 law school students.43 Participants in this
psychologist recently has pointed out the need for empirical investigation of the effects of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, as in the case with the assumption of
early legal scholars about the inefficiency of the court system, he points out that there is
little empirical data supporting the current assumption that there is a tort litigation crisis.
Saks, 44 Am Psychologist 1110 (cited in note 19) (citing statistical studies suggesting that
there may even be relatively few tort filings as compared to the estimated incidence of
negligence).
34. Schlegel, 28 Buff L Rev at 513 n 266 (cited in note 32).
35. Id at 513-15.
36. Id at 519.
37. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 469 (1897).
38. Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 148 (cited in note 3). However, Supreme Court Justices
have also embraced social science at times. See Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 228 (1976)
(the law should look to "the scientific approach to an understanding of the motive forces
of human conduct") (Brennan dissenting) (quoting Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 296
(1972) (Brennan concurring).
39. Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 204 (1976). See also Lamprecbt v FCC, 958 F2d
382, 398 (DC Cir 1992).
40. Ballew v Georgia, 435 US 223, 246 (1978) (Powell concurring). Numerology is a
"system of occult built around numbers." Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 148 (cited in note 3).
41. Missouri v Jenkins, 115 S Ct 2038, 2065 (1995) (Thomas concurring).
42. See Saks and Baron, UselNonuse/Misuse at 75 (cited in note 19).
43. Richard E. Redding and N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers" Socio-Political
Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, forthcoming in
__ L & Human Beh - (1999).
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study were asked to evaluate and comment on the legal relevance, admissibili-
ty, and dispositive weight of social science research evidence introduced in
actual court cases. A common sentiment was that it is possible to find an
expert to support any theory, that experts and researchers are biased as a
function of their own beliefs or who is paying them to testify, and that statis-
tics and social science are inherently unreliable. Typical comments by study
participants include: "[The research studies are] merely academic bull ....
Statistics can be made to say anything," and "Statistical studies can easily be
manipulated according to the factors used and the weight given each factor.
[You] can always get a statistical study to give you a result you want."'
Nor do juries give great credence to social science evidence, whether
admitted in the form of testimony about research findings or as clinical expert
opinion. Again, scientific testimony tends to be discounted when it conflicts
with jurors' common-sense notions of human behavior. For example, jurors
have reported that they found research showing the relative unreliability of
eyewitness identification to be unpersuasive and insulting because it means that
"you can't trust your own perceptions."4' Jurors perceive the research evi-
dence, which paints a very different picture of eyewitness reliability than our
common-sense assumptions do," as a purely academic construction unconnec-
ted to their real-world experience.47
In sum, the legal system frequently does not have high confidence in social
science. Research findings are seen as malleable and unreliable, not reflective
of the reality and complexity of the real world, subject to differing interpreta-
tions, or confounded by the researcher's own preconceptions and biases.48
When research refutes common-sense psychology, it is often dismissed as
invalid. When the research supports common-sense psychology, it is often
dismissed as unnecessary because it merely confirms common sense.
44. Id. On the other hand, other participants made positive comments about the value
of social science research evidence.
45. Sundby, 83 Va L Rev at 1133 (cited in note 24) (reporting on juror reaction to
expert testimony). Another juror referred to an expert witness on eyewitness reliability as
a "charlatan" because "in testifying about how people misperceive events, the expert
'obviously . . . was talking about us . .. I don't think they should have done it.'" Id.
46. Id at 1134 n 63 (citing studies).
47. Id at 1139.
48. For a striking example of how the same data can be interpreted very differently
by researchers with distinct perspectives on the public policy issues informed by the
research, see Neil Gilbert, Examining the Facts: Advocacy Research Overstates the
Incidence of Date and Acquaintance Rape, in Richard J. Gelles and Donileen R. Loseke,
eds, Current Controversies in Family Violence 120 (Sage 1993); Mary P. Koss and Sarah
L. Cook, Facing the Facts: Date and Acquaintance Rape are Significant Problems for
Women, in Gelles and Loseke, Current Controversies at 104.
For an expos6 of how scientific data and statistics are routinely distorted in the
public policy arena, see generally Cynthia Crossen, Tainted Truth: The Manipulation of
Fact in America (Simon & Schuster 1994).
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III. Why Do Courts Ignore Social Science Research?
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience."49
"The closer [research] studies come to plain logic, or horse sense, the
more accepted they are."" °
"The most persuasive arguments are not necessarily those that contain
the most empirical data. They are not necessarily the ones that employ
the tightest syllogisms or that use the most complicated forms of analysis.
The most compelling arguments are those that connect best with the
imagination .
Donald Bersoff asks, "[W]hy have the courts treated the work of psycholo-
gists and other scientists so condescendingly and cavalierly?" 2 J. Alexander
Tanford reviews various theories suggested over the years: judges are conserva-
tive while social scientists are liberal; judges are egocentric and believe they do
not need help from social science; judges are threatened by social science;
judges do not understand social science; it is human nature to think unscientif-
ically; and law and social science have competing systems of reasoning."3
There may be another reason: the law ignores social science when social
science fails to consider adequately the common-sense psychology inherent in
law. Like everyone, lawyers and judges make implicit assumptions about
human behavior. Based on a shared corpus of common experience this CS-psy-
chology, also called ethnopsychology, naive psychology, and indigenous
psychology, 4 is the "commonsense empirical generalizations about human
behavior which we accept on the culture's authority plus introspection plus
anecdotal evidence from ordinary life." s5 Much of law is a codification of
various CS-psychologies, and social science research typically will be ignored
49. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 1 (Little, Brown 1881).
50. Redding and Reppucci, Effects (cited in note 43) (reporting one judge's comment
about social science research evidence introduced in court cases).
51. D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S Cal
Interdisc L J 55 (1997).
52. Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 156 (cited in note 28).
53. Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 152-56 (cited in note 3).
54. See Harold H. Kelley, Common-Sense Psychology and Scientific Psychology, 43 Ann
Rev Psychol 1 (1992).
55. Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical
Psychologist, 27 J Soc Issues 65, 66 (1971). The law's common-sense psychology is closely
akin to "practical reason." Judge Posner defines it as including "anecdote, introspection,
imagination, common sense, intuition . . . metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom . . .
experience." Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 88 Mich L Rev 827,
838 (1988).
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when it fails to take into account the CS-psychology inherent in law.5 6 In
Parham v J.R.,s7 for example, the Supreme Court based its decision on "the
pages of human experience" and "common human experience," though those
assumptions were directly contrary to then-existing social science research and
clinical experience."
Law is all about storytelling, 9 and the stories found in the "pages of
human experience" are more compelling for law than the ANOVAs, correla-
tions, and effect sizes of research studies.61 Consider hermeneutics-
knowledge gained from practical, experiential understanding.61 For the legal
system, the difference between scientific empiricism and hermeneutics (or CS-
psychology) is like "the difference between a map of a city and an account of
that city by someone who lives in it and walks its streets. " '
In often failing to consider fully the CS-psychology embodied in law as a
starting point, psycholegal research and advocacy has not been truly interdisci-
plinary. Nonetheless, the degree to which law is receptive to empirical
psycholegal research will always be somewhat limited because law is chiefly a
profession rather than an academic discipline and because lawyers are not
trained researchers.'3 Law professor Pierre Schrag notes that the law's "in-
ternal perspective" rejects critical analyses not within the doctrines and princi-
ples of law itself. "There is a recurrent sameness to American legal
thought . . . from saying over and over again what the law is and saying it,
56. See David E. VanZandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial
Decisions, 65 Tul L Rev 775, 777, 792-93 (1991) (arguing that judges rely on "common
sense" when law fails to provide sufficient guidelines). In addition, the law has a strong
normative thrust which may conflict with empirical reality. See Richard Delgado, Norms
and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U Pa L
Rev 933 (1991).
57. 442 US 602, 609 (1979).
58. See Melton, Family and Mental Hospital (cited in note 19); Gail S. Perry and Gary
B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example,
22 J Fam L 633, 635 (1983-84).
59. See generally Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric
in the Law (Yale 1996).
60. See Welch, 6 S Cal Interdisc L J at 60-62, 74 (cited in note 51) (providing
examples where emotionally powerful stories-the powerful anecdotes-of individual
suffering drove legislative decisions, and arguing that individual stories do and should
engage the emotions and moral judgment in a way empirical data never can). See also
George S. Howard, Culture Tales: A Narrative Approach to Thinking, Cross-Cultural Psy-
chology, and Psychotherapy, 46 Am Psychologist 187 (1991).
61. Martin J. Packer, Hermeneutic Inquiry in the Study of Human Conduct, 40 Am
Psychologist 1081 (1985); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Harper 1962) (John
MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, trans) (originally published 1927).
62. Packer, 40 Am Psychologist at 1091 (cited in note 61).
63. J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinary as Colonization, 53 Wash & Lee L Rev 949, 952
(1996). See also Schlegel, American Legal Realism at 80, 256-57 (cited in note 31)
(suggesting that use of empirical social science in law threatens law professors' professional
identity by making them just another type of social scientist; concern over professional
identity will prevent the legal academy from fully embracing social science in law).
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of course, in a way that conforms with the law itself."64 Unlike law, academ-
ic research psychology is enamored with new ideas:
Although [the law] indulges purely theoretical debate (primarily in law
schools), its orientation is pragmatic and applied-thus narrowing the
range of topics lawyers will allow themselves to think about . . . . The
operational nature of the legal profession makes lawyers more pragmatic,
more accustomed to making do with what is available, and being com-
fortable with the "quick and dirty." Academic psychologists are attracted
to things that are new and "interesting," lawyers to things that work.
"Old" ideas may be obvious and boring, but they may also be operative
and controlling in many contexts."
Lawyers and judges tend to view academic work skeptically, even within legal
scholarship itself." For example, Judge Edwards comments, "Too many law
professors are ivory tower dilettantes."67 Indeed, there is a huge disconnect
between the practice of law and legal scholarship; seldom do lawyers or judges
consult the law review journals, for example.6 8
64. Pierre Schrag, Anti-intellectualism, 16 Card L Rev 1110 (1995).
65. Haney, 4 L & Human Beh at 168 (cited in note 19).
66. By contrast, practicing psychologists (who probably also read few academic jour-
nals) have had significant research experience as part of their doctoral training.
67. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Professional, Mich L Rev 34, 36 (1992). See also Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost
Lawyer at 11-52, 165-69 (Harvard, 1993) (arguing that the legal tradition of "practical
wisdom" should be re-asserted against the interdisciplinary social science trend in modern
legal scholarship).
68. See Thomas Grisso and Gary B. Melton, Getting Child Development Research to
Legal Practitioners: Which Way to the Trenches?, in Reforming at 146, 159-61 (cited in
note 1) (reporting survey of 40 family court judges finding that only 33% read at least
one article in their state university's law review and only 10% read at least one article in
any other law reviews; most read state bar and popular journals); Hafemeister and
Melton, Impact of Social Science Research at 27, 37-43 (cited in note 15) (reporting data
showing appellate courts rarely site law review articles in court opinions). Indeed, one of
the jokes at the appellate court where I clerked was that a sure sign of desperation was
having to repair to the law reviews for legal authority.
See also Victor L. Streib, Academic Research and Advocacy Research, 36 Clev St L
Rev 253, 256 (1988) ("The research limitations on the lawyer advocate are often
severe. . . . Beckoning sidestrips must be shunned, and background reading of law review
articles is an extravagant luxury. Trial judges, and even appellate courts, give little
encouragement for the Brandeis Brief or even exposition of the argument beyond the
primary statutes and case holdings.") Weiss, Diffusion of Social Science Research at 63,
69-75 (cited in note 13) (reporting policy-makers are far too busy to read scholarly
research or even short summary documents or policy briefings, relying instead on word of
mouth and popular media reports).
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IV. Psychology's Critique of Law's CS-Psychology
"The indefiniteness of much detail in common sense, its contradic-
tions, its lack of established grounds, drive thought to seek definiteness,
consistency and reasons. Thought finds these in the criticized and refined
knowledge of mathematics, science, and philosophy, only to discover that
these tend to thin out into arbitrary definitions, pointer readings, and
tentative hypotheses. Astounded at the thinness and hollowness of these
cumulating achievements of conscientiously responsible cognition, thought
seeks matter for its definitions, significance for its pointer readings, and
support for its wobbling hypotheses . . . . But where shall it turn? It
does, in fact, turn back to common sense, that indefinite and irresponsi-
ble source which it so lately scorned. But it does so, generally, with a
bad grace. After filling its empty definitions and pointer readings and
hypotheses with meanings out of the rich confusion of common sense, it
generally turns its head away, shuts its eyes to what it has been doing,
and affirms dogmatically the self-evidence and certainty of the common-
sense significance it has drawn into its concepts. "69
When psychologists and psycholegal scholars critique the law's lack of
empirical foundation, they implicitly challenge the CS-psychology foundation
of law. Some have done so explicitly.7" Scholars have even characterized reli-
ance on CS psychology as an error of reasoning: "The opinions of Supreme
Court justices reflect the same reasoning errors and the same unconscious
reification of [ordinary common sense] principles."" Psychologists have
roundly criticized Supreme Court cases such as Parham v J.R.' for relying on
"common experience." In Parham, common experience dictated that minors
lack the maturity to make treatment decisions and that parents act in their
69. Kenneth R. Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty,
Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice 314 (Oxford 1996) (quoting Stephen C. Pepper,
World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence 44-46 (California 1942)).
70. For critiques of legal decision-making based on common sense, see Bersoff, 37 Viii
L Rev 1569 (cited in note 19); Bersoff and Glass, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 279 (cited
in note 19); Melton, Family and Mental Hospital 151 (cited in note 19); Michael L.
Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic
Reasoning, 69 Neb L Rev 3 (1990); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality,
Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive
Dissonance, 19:2 Bull Am Acad Psych & L 131 (1991); Perry & Melton, 22 J Fam L
633 (cited in note 58).
Similarly, many critics of jury decision-making and the jury system generally, par-
ticularly in cases involving complex or scientific evidence, point to the fact that juries rely
too much on mere common sense. See generally Daniel W. Shuman and Anthony
Champagne, Removing People From the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and Research on
Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 Psych Pub Pol & L 242 (1997); Craig Haney,
Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the "Will of the People,"
3 Psych Pub Pol & L 303 (1997).
71. Perlin, 69 Neb L Rev at 69 (cited in note 70) (emphasis added).
72. 442 US 584 (1979) (upholding civil commitment of minors without judicial review).
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best interests, whereas psychological studies and the clinical experience of
mental health professionals indicated to the contrary.73 "Ignoring method-
ologically sound social science research, the Court has based its opinions on
such unreliable sources as 'the pages of human experience."'74
Indeed, psychologists have long viewed common sense with great skepti-
cism. "The difficulty with common sense is that it lulls us into the false
security of believing that we already understand people, whereas psychology
raises questions about what we really do understand and goes beyond com-
mon-sense formulations."' 5 While scientific inquiry inevitably is influenced by
scientists' life experiences and common sense,76 for the most part, psycholo-
gists do not take CS-psychology very seriously. Instead, they argue that "[t]he
great problem with a reliance on common sense as evidence of psychological
truths is that these truths are so defective . . .. " However, it is obviously in
psychology's self-interest to cast CS-psychology as the illegitimate stepchild of
scientific psychology, for doing so preserves psychologists' unique expertise.78
"The view of common sense as a (faulty) theory remains the preferred basis
for its relation to psychology, and the psychologist's role of authority is
saved.""'
V. The Law's Imperviousness to Scientific Psychology
Privileged to live in the "heavenly city of the eighteenth century [Enlighten-
ment] philosophers,"" psychologists often say to the law: you are not as
rational or as enlightened as we because you rely on nothing more than
everyday common sense.8 Empirical psychological science has the answers,
73. See Melton, Family and Mental Hospital 151 (cited in note 19); Perry and Melton,
22 J Fam L 633 (cited in note 58).
74. Bersoff, 37 Viii L Rev at 1594 (cited in note 19) (quoting Parham v J.R.) (em-
phasis added).
75. Harvey C. Lindgren and John H. Harvey, An Introduction to Social Psychology 7
(Mosby 1981).
76. See William Bevan and Frank Kessel, Plain Truths and Home Cooking: Thoughts
on the Making and Remaking of Psychology, 49 Am Psychologist 505 (1994).
77. Gregory A. Kimble, Psychology From the Standpoint of a Generalist, 44 Am
Psychologist 491, 492 (1989). See also Fran A. Geldard, The Human Senses 1-2 (John
Wiley 1953) ("We come readily to generalize from our experiences and to develop a set
of beliefs concerning the operation of the human mind .... [I]t is not surprising that
hasty convictions, half-truths, even superstitions become lodged in our mental constitu-
tions.")
78. Maarten Derksen, Are We Not Experimenting Then?: The Rhetorical Demarcation
of Psychology and Common Sense, 7 Theory & Psychol 435, 444 (1997).
79. Id at 451.
80. Seymour B. Sarason, Psychology to the Finland Station in the Heavenly City of the
Eighteenth Century Philosophers, 30 Am Psychologist 1072, 1076 (1975).
81. Appeals to common sense, intuition, or emotional understanding are often attacked
by scientists as "anti-intellectual." See Hammond, Human Judgment at 60 (cited in note
69); Welch, 6 S Cal Interdisc L J at 55-65 (cited in note 51) (reviewing arguments against
emotion-based reasoning).
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and when our studies contradict your common sense, as they often do, you
should forsake the common wisdom for the superior rationality of our sci-
ence:"2 "We reject a positivistic approach . . . but we adhere to a belief in
empiricism." 3 The scientific method is superior to your "fireside inductions"
and is more reliable than the data gathered through your everyday experiences,
the common wisdom, and the lessons of history.
What might be the response of the common law, not privileged to live in
the "heavenly city" of academic psychology? Should law abandon its tradition-
al common sense in favor of social science statistics? Paul E. Meehl, a "hard-
headed, dustbowl-empiricist," s4 best known for his arguments against individ-
ualized clinical judgment in favor of statistically based predictions of behav-
ior,s puts it aptly:
A shrewd lawyer, even though he might not know enough philosophy,
logic of science, experimental method, or technical statistics to recognize
just what is wrong with a particular scientific refutation of the fireside
inductions, may nevertheless be right in holding to what he learned at his
grandmother's knee or through practical experience, rather than abandon-
ing it because, say, "Fisbee's definitive experiment on social conformity"
allegedly shows the contrary . . . . [S]ocial scientists tend to denigrate
non-experimental sources of knowledge (such as clinical experience,
analysis of documents, file data, or the fireside inductions). Then, by
equating "experimental" with "empirical" with "scientific," they often
imply that any knowledge source other than experimental is methodologi-
cally worthless (armchair speculation, appeal to authority, metaphysics,
folklore, and the like). But the fireside inductions are empirical. No
logician would hesitate to say this. Their subject matter is the domain of
empirical phenomena, and one who invokes a fireside induction will,
when pressed to defend it, appeal to some kind of experience which he
expects the critic will share with him, whether personally or vicarious-
ly.8 6
82. Science often rejects other forms of knowing, even when supported by "data." See
Brent D. Slife and Richard N. Williams, Toward a Theoretical Psychology: Should a
Subdiscipline Be Formally Recognized?, 52 Am Psychologist 117, 120 (1997) (arguing that
some psychological ideas are rejected "[not] because they are unsupported by the data"
but because they were not arrived at through scientific method).
83. Melton, Guidelines for Effect Diffusion at 280 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
84. Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 68 (cited in note 55).
85. See Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and
Review of the Evidence (Minnesota 1954).
86. Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 67-68, 78 (cited in note 55). See also Derksen, 7 Theory
& Psychol at 444 (cited in note 78) (arguing everyone is a psychologist-we are all
conducting psychological experiments in everyday life); Robert Formaini, The Myth of
Scientific Public Policy 97-98 (Transaction 1990) ("People need not hold advanced degrees
or be experts in natural or social science in order to assess accurately whether existing
policy is good or bad, effective or counterproductive, useless or outdated. Their beliefs
about the policies they live with are important, no matter how irrational they might
appear to be to experts. Those beliefs will have to be dealt with in any event, so there
is little reason for policy elites to ridicule them. Such attitudes are examples of the very
1998]
120 Roundtable
Meehl provides several then-current examples in which psychologists' advocacy
was driven more by ideology than solid research.87 The research was insuffi-
cient to support the policy position advocated, usually because it was far less
ecologically valid and generalizable than the CS-psychology it supposedly
refuted.
Two contemporary examples illustrate well how psycholegal researchers
and advocates ignore the law's CS-psychology at their peril.
Example 1: Medical Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents. Much of
juvenile law rests on the common-sense assumption that juveniles lack adult-
like maturity of judgment, with the Supreme Court repeatedly relying on this
assumption to deny adolescents certain decision-making rights. The Court's
assumption reflects historical tradition and common experience. "[T]he ex-
perience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law"88 suggests that
adolescents lack the "maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions.""
Yet, psychologists who advocate for the expansion of adolescents' self-
determination rights9" fail adequately to address and to credit the law's CS-
psychology assumption that adolescents do not possess sufficient maturity to
make legally important decisions. In its amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in
three cases,9' the APA on argued that psychological research on adolescent
cognitive development strongly supported the conclusion that adolescents age
14 and older are sufficiently "competent" to make abortion decisions. Recent-
ly, however, researchers have begun to question the strength and legal rele-
vance of the research.92 "The briefs overstated what is known about the
unscientific mindset that experts so often deplore in other people, for they explicitly ignore
reality by positing a world where perfectly-informed elites enact correct policies for the
good of all, whether or not such policies are publicly supported.")
87. Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 68-87 (cited in note 55).
88. Thompson v Oklahoma, 487 US 815, 823 (1987) (quoting Goss v Lopez, 419 US
565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell dissenting).
89. Parham, 442 US at 602.
90. See, for example, Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, Adolescent
Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues, 42 Am Psychologist 73 (1987); Gary B. Melton,
Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in Public Policy,
38 Am Psychologist 99 (1983); Gary B. Melton and Nancy Felipe Russo, Adolescent
Abortion: Psychological Perspectives on Theory and Policy, 141 Am J Psych 10 (1984);
K.L. Morrison, J.K. Morrison, and S. Holdridge-Crane, The Child's Right to Give
Informed Consent to Psychiatric Treatment, J Clinical Child Psych 43 (Spr 1979).
91. Hartigan v Zbaraz, 484 US 171 (1987); Thornburgh v American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S Ct 2169 (1986); Hodgson v Minnesota, 110 S Ct
2969 (1990).
92. See William Gardner, David Scherer, and Maya Tester, Asserting Scientific Au-
thority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am Psychologist 895
(1989); Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci, and Jennifer L. Woolard, Evaluating
Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 L & Human Beh 221, 224-28 (1995).
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development of decision-making skills." ' The advocacy was based on a few
studies having small numbers of subjects that did not investigate all facets of
real-world decision-making.94 The research failed to consider important social
maturity variables (like resistance to peer and parental pressure and attitudes
toward risk) highly relevant to adolescent medico-legal decision-making. Recent
studies examining these variables have found significant differences between
adolescents and adults, revealing the fragile empirical base upon which the
advocacy was based.95
This example demonstrates four important points about why psycholegal
researchers and advocates should not ignore CS-psychology inherent in law.
First, the law's CS-psychology can usefully inform the course of scientific re-
search. 9 Had psychologists credited the law's assumption of adolescent
immaturity enough to investigate the empirical basis of that assumption, they
would have investigated maturity variables from the outset rather than belated-
ly "discovering" their importance." Second, the law's CS-psychology can
inform researchers about the legally relevant, real-world variables of interest.
Legal advocacy may have been more successful had psycholegal researchers
addressed the maturity issue directly. Third, the law's CS-psychology can
provide a useful historical and social context against which to evaluate the
strength and generalizability of scientific research. Those advocating legal
policies based on a small number of studies probably should have been more
circumspect about the weight and ecological validity of that empirical evidence,
given the many "pages of human experience" suggesting that adolescents lack
maturity of judgment. Fourth, the law's CS-psychology often is no less empiri-
cally objective or value-laden than scientific research. While researchers and
advocates attacked the normative, value-laden nature of the law's assumptions
about adolescent maturity,"' they failed to consider the possible impact of
their own values on their interpretation of the data. Researchers' belief that
93. Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, 44 Am Psychologist at 897 (cited in note 92).
94. Id.
95. See Woolard, Reppucci, and Redding, 20 L & Human Beh at 230-33 (cited in
note 5); Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L & Human Beh 249, 252-69
(1996).
96. See John Monahan and Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 Ann Rev
Psychol 441, 446 (1982).
97. Woolard, Reppucci, and Redding suggest that the law of informed consent, which
emphasizes cognitive decision-making capacity, is perhaps one reason psychologists
neglected maturity variables to focus on cognitive variables. See Woolard, Reppucci, and
Redding, 20 L & Human Beh at 227 (cited in note 5). However, the "appreciation"
requirement found in many consent statutes and related case law generally encompasses
issues of maturity. See Monahan and Loftus,-33 Ann Rev Psychol at 443-44 (cited in note
96). Furthermore, Supreme Court opinions explicitly and repeatedly mention adolescents'
lack of maturity as a primary reason for denying them decision-making rights. The Court
has even specified the relevant maturity variables, including adolescents' impulsivity and
lack of self discipline. See Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 115-16 (1982).
98. See Melton, 38 Am Psychologist 99 (cited in note 90).
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adolescents should be empowered to make life decisions99 may have biased
their study designs and interpretations in ways that favored finding adolescents
competent by ignoring the maturity variables that differentiate adolescents from
adults. Research constructs reflect implicit ideologies that constrain research
questions. °° Here, researchers chose the construct "competence" rather than
"maturity" or "judgment," and it likely affected their research and legal
advocacy agendas.
Example 2: Detention and Sentencing Decisions Based on Predictions of
Violence. In upholding the constitutionality of detention or sentencing decisions
based on expert predictions that a defendant will or will not commit future
violent crimes, the Supreme Court "especially rejected . . . sociological da-
ta ... [suggesting] 'that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that
the question is so vague as to be meaningless."" 0' Psycholegal scholars and
advocates at the time vehemently disagreed with and criticized the Court,
pointing to research showing that mental health professionals' predictions of
future dangerousness were no better than chance. 0 2 "Rarely has research
been so uncritically accepted and so facilely generalized by both mental health
professionals and lawyers."'0 3 However, a re-analysis of 44 studies on vio-
lence prediction0 4 along with second-generation research using better meth-
odologies, indicates that clinicians' predictions are significantly better than
chance.' Thus, the law's original, consistent common-sense assumption that
clinicians should have some expertise in predicting violence has been shown to
have scientific validity.0 6
Of course, the changing nature of science is not an indictment of research-
based advocacy; CS-psychology changes over time as scientific knowledge does,
albeit less so. But the above examples illustrate the risks in dismissing CS-
psychology too quickly and uncritically relying on an uncertain body of
99. Id.
100. See Bevan and Kessel, 44 Am Psychologist at 506 (cited in note 76); Paul
Feyerabend, Against Method (Verso rev ed 1988).
101. Schall v Martin, 467 US 253, 278-79 (1984) (quoting Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262,
274 (1976)).
102. See for example, Charles Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on
Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Pro-
ceedings, 8 Am J L & Med 407, 418 (1983); Charles Ewing, Preventive Detention and
Execution: The Constitutionality of Punishing Future Crimes, 15 L & Human Beh 139,
141 (1991). See also Martin v Strasburg, 513 F Supp 691 (1981), affd 689 F2d 365
(1982), rev'd as Schall v Martin, 467 US 253 (1984) (citing studies).
103. John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation
of Theory and Policy, 141 Am J Psych 10 (1984).
104. See Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About
Accuracy, 62 J Consult & Clin Psychol 783 (1994).
105. See Charles W. Lidz, Edward P. Mulvey, and William Gardner, The Accuracy of
Predictions of Violence of Others, 269 JAMA 275 (1993); John Monahan and Henry J.
Steadman, eds, Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment 4
(Chicago 1994).
106. See Mossman, 62 J Consult & Clin Psychol 783 (cited in note 104).
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scientific research. These risks are serious for law because the principle of stare
decisis makes it difficult for law to change with shifting research findings. 10 7
The next section discusses the importance of ecological (real-world) validity
in psycholegal research and how, unfortunately, that research often has failed
to maintain the level of ecological validity necessary for its successful incorpo-
ration into law, particularly when compared to the real-world empiricism of
CS-psychology.
VI. The (Lack of) Ecological Validity in Psycholegal Research
Historically, psychology has been a discipline of theoretically based
laboratory research asking "questions suited to scientific method rather than
those suggested by social problems.""0 ' When psychology discarded philo-
sophical reasoning (or "armchair inductions") in favor of scientific method at
around the turn of the century, it "had arrived" as a science." 9 Use of the
scientific method is a signifier "not only for purposes of arriving at truth but
as a criterion for membership in the fraternity."1 In psychology, there is a
tendency to emphasize counterintuitive research findings, arrived at through
scientific method, that challenge real-world assumptions and CS-psycholo-
gy.111 Much like obtaining null results in a research study, that which ap-
107. See Alan J. Tompkins and Joe S. Cecil, Treating Social Science Like Law: An
Assessment of Monahan and Walker's Social Authority Proposal, 2 Shep Exp & Sci Evid
Q 343, 378-84 (1994) (arguing that it is problematic to treat research findings as legal
authority because stare decisis prevents that authority from keeping pace with changing
research findings).
108. Wursten and Sales, 16 Am J Community Psychol at 489 (cited in note 1); see also
Kirk J. Schneider, Toward a Science of the Heart: Romanticism and the Revival of
Psychology, 53 Am Psychologist 277, 282-86 (1998) (arguing that, in being so highly
empirical and reductionistic and by distancing itself from art, cuture, and the humanities,
psychology has lost touch with the real lives of people and has not investigated sufficiently
how research finding reflate to everyday situations and concerns).
109. See Sarason, 30 Am Psychologist at 1075 (cited in note 80).
110. Id at 1075. Modem psychology is so experimentally oriented that academic psy-
chologists who publish only theoretical work are often viewed pejoratively by their
colleagues as "not scientists" or "not researchers." Scientists "do empirical work," and in
most academic psychology departments, empirical research is the coin of the realm. (A
frequent pejorative query often heard about those during theoretical work: "When is the
last time he did any research?"). See Slife and Williams, 52 Am Psychologist at 119-20
(cited in note 82) ("Theorizing is secondary to the supposedly more precise, experimental
pursuit of knowledge. For generations, theses and dissertations were judged not by their
theoretical coherence but by whether specific hypotheses were posed in relation to exact
procedures, methodological controls, and quantitative analyses."); Geir Smedslund, Some
Psychological Theories Are Not Empirical: A Conceptual Analysis of the 'Stages of
Change' Model, 7 Theory & Psychol 529, 541 (1997) (many psychologists believe that
"all psychological research is empirical.").
111. See Michael Billig, Rhetoric of Social Psychology, in Ian Parker and John Shotter,
eds, Deconstructing Social Psychology 47 (Routledge 1990); Haney, 4 L & Human Beh
at 159, 190 (cited in note 19); N. Miller & V.E. Pollack, Meta-Analysis and Some
Science-Compromising Problems for Social Psychology, in William R. Shadish and Steve
1998]
124 Roundtable
pears only to explicate and better define CS-psychology is seen as less valuable.
Psychologists may fear their findings will only explicate the obvious--what
everyone's grandmother knows:
In its reaction to the charge that it was "bubba psychology," in the early
1960's social psychology developed a strong theme-one might say an
ethos-of "demonstrating the non-obvious," so much so that it developed
"various implicit strategies for lending the appearance of non-obviousness
to research (e.g., by imputing false or oversimple beliefs to "common
sense" in order to provide a straw man that the research can then demol-
ish, or by creating gaps between the conceptualization of the work (cast
in non-obvious terms) and its operationalization (rather obvious when
stripped of its technical jargon)).112
The need to demonstrate the non-obvious produced a reductionist, laboratory-
based psychology. 3 in "the quest for a result that will surprise Bubba," 4
producing internally valid studies that often lacked ecological validity"' with
a rigid, cult-like adherence to empirical method." 6
By contrast, psychology in specific real-world contexts is the only psycho-
logical concern of the law; "the law is an operational discipline-its concerns
are those of the real world.""..7 The law needs situationally specific research,
not "abstracted empiricism,"" 8 and the law often has found social science
research too "academic," or artificial, for use in legal decision-making. For
Fuller, eds, The Social Psychology of Science 230, 238-41 (Guilford 1994).
112. Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 14 (cited in note 54).
113. The same criticism has been made of other empirically-oriented social sciences. See,
for example, Peter Bauer, The Disregard of Reality, 7 Cato J 29, 33-34 (1987)
("[Elconomics has become little more than a branch of applied mathematics and one that
can be successfully pursued with little reference to real-life phenomena . . . . [S]tudies
based on direct observation or detailed examination of slices of history are apt to be
dismissed as anecdotal, unscholarly, or unscientific, even if they are informative.").
114. Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psych at 14 (cited in note 54).
115. See Haney, 4 L & Human Beh at 167, 190-91 (cited in note 19).
116. See Stephen Toulmin and David E. Leary, The Cult of Empiricism in Psychology,
and Beyond, in Sigmund Koch and David E. Leary, eds, A Century of Psychology as
Science 594 (McGraw Hill 1985); N. Dickon Reppucci, Ecological Validity and the
Deritualization of Process, in Patrick Tolan, et al, eds, Researching Community Psycholo-
gy: Issues of Theory and Method 160 (Am Psych Assn 1990). See also Gregory A.
Kimble, A New Formula for Behaviorism, 101 Psychological Rev 254, 258 (1994) (arguing
psychology must "avoid the silliness" of mistaking psychology for common sense: "Science
is empirical. Truth is in the confirmable facts of observation . . . . For ordinary people
truth is what they have learned from experience, what everybody knows, and what only
stands to reason. The current fad of seeking truth in intuition, argument, common sense,
and literature accepts these other understandings without apparent comprehension that they
may not be the same as, or even compatible with, scientific truth.").
117. Haney, 4 L & Human Beh at 168 (cited in note 19).
118. Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 159 (cited in note 28) (quoting Arlene S. Skolnick,
The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context, 39 L &
Contemp Probs 38, 52 (1975)).
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example, in Lockhart v McCree the Supreme Court rejected many of the
empirical studies, complaining that, inter alia, they did not include actual
jurors as participants and that most did not simulate the jury deliberation
process.119 Similarly, research on juror decision-making in rape cases over the
last twenty years may have been ignored by courts because of its highly
artificial conditions. Typically, studies present college students, rather than an
actual cross-section of potential jurors, with case vignettes describing a stranger
rape case in which the defendant is probably guilty. 2 ' By presenting very
limited case scenarios that test the effects of specific variables, the research has
been so highly reductionist that it has obscured the larger picture produced by
the complex, contextual interaction among variables."' 1
Thus, it is still the case that much psycholegal research uses artificial
laboratory tasks and situations, with volunteers or a convenient sample of
college students who may not have the same characteristics as the general
population.1" Compared to problems constructed in the laboratory, real-
world problems exist in a far larger and more complex context involving
complicated interactions between variables, contexts, and tasks that are difficult
to isolate, quantify, and control." It was Freud who pointed out years ago
that laboratory experiments often cannot adequately reproduce the ecological
context of the real world.124 This premise holds particularly true for the
unique context of the courtroom: "[Y]ou will never be able to reproduce in
your experiments the same psychological situation as in the examination of a
guilty person in the criminal court.""2 s
119. Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 168-73 (1986) (upholding the "death qualifica-
tion" of jurors in capital cases).
120. See Lynda Olsen-Fulero and Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments:
An Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 Psychol Pub Pol & L
402, 404-11 (1997).
121. Id at 404-20.
122. See Ralph L. Rosnow and Robert Rosenthal, People Studying People: Artifacts and
Ethics in Behavioral Research 73, 98-99 (Freeman 1997) (documenting that most psycho-
logical research studies use college students as participants and reviewing research showing
that volunteers tend to be better educated and more intelligent, tend to come from higher
socioeconomic classes, and are less conventional and conforming).
123. Peter Suefeld and Philip E. Tetlock, Psychologists as Policy Advocates: The Roots
of Controversy, in Peter Suefeld and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Psychology and Social Policy
12-13 (Hemisphere 1992). See also Olsen-Fulero and Fulero, 3 Psychol Pub Pol & L at
418 (cited in note 120) (suggesting that "the inconsistent and confusing results of rape-
responsibility research to this point are due largely to the attempt of researchers to
fragmentize a highly complex phenomenon without a clear picture of the whole. Although
scores of studies show effects of juror, victim, defendant, and situational factors on
judgments of guilt and blame for rape, the interaction effects of these variables are often
larger than the main effects. . .. I.
124. See Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 151-52 (cited in note 28).
125. Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law,
in Joan Riviere, trans, Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud (Basic 1959) (originally
published in 1906).
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Moreover, researchers tend to use the norms of science when judging the
validity of the CS-psychology inherent in law, failing to consider the real-world
exigencies with which the law concerns itself. Consider Saks's and Kidd's
criticisms of jury selection jurisprudence:
They gleefully attempt to rebut a Supreme Court decision which conclud-
ed that juries of 6 people are as likely to represent a reasonable cross-
section of a community as juries of 12 people. Their argument rests on
calculations showing that stratified random samples of size 12 are more
likely to contain members of minority groups than samples of size 6.
Unfortunately, however, in their haste to find legal illustrations of biased
judgment, these legal experts forget the simple fact (which they well
know) that juries are neither in practice nor in principle intended to be
selected at random.
126
Consider also Kahneman's and Tversky's seminal and oft-cited research
showing the error-prone and biased nature of lay people's decision-making.127
Much of this research lacks ecological validity-that is, studies using college
student volunteers who probably have little motivation to perform the artificial
laboratory decision tasks. Laypersons' decision-making is evaluated against the
norms of scientific decision-making (that is, probability theory and statistics)
without accounting for the decision-making goal of the layperson, which is not
to arrive at scientific "truth" but to satisfy the practical exigencies of everyday
life.' 2
8
In contrast to much of research psychology, a CS-psychology approach to
psycholegal research and advocacy seeks to maximize ecological validity by
attending to context and history. It means looking to law as a source of data
about human behavior, particularly data about the rules of social conduct." 9
126. Lola L. Lopes, The Rhetoric of Irrationality, 1 Theory & Psychol 65, 80 (1991)
(emphasis added) (referring to Michael J. Saks and Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L & Society Rev 123, 134-35 (1980-
81)).
127. Id at 67 (noting that the research has been widely cited and accepted in psycholo-
gy as well as in other disciplines) ("Human incompetence is presented as a fact, like gravi-
ty."). Researchers have emphasized results showing human error rather than those showing
accuracy. Id at 66-67, 76-78 ("Their slogan could well be: When better decisions are
made, decision researchers will make them. . . .The idea that people-are-irrational-and-
science-has-proved-it is useful propaganda for anyone who has rationality to sell.") See
also Peter White, A Model of the Layperson as Pragmatist, 10 Personality & Soc Psychol
Bull 333, 334, 337 (1984). For a colloquy between Kahneman and Tversky and a
prominent critic of their research, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, On the
Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 Psychol Rev 582 (1996); Gerd Gigerenzer, On Narrow
Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky, 103 Psychol Rev 592
(1996).
128. Lopes, 1 Theory & Psychol at 78 (cited in note 126); White, 10 Personality &
Soc Psychol Bull at 334 (cited in note 127).
129. See Bernard Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility: A Foundation for a Theory of
Social Conduct (Guilford 1995).
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VII. Some Cautions About Common-Sense Psychology
Since it derives directly from "the pages of human experience," 30 CS-
psychology is the most ecological psychology available. However, this does not
mean that CS-psychology is without its own set of problems. It comes with
some baggage as well.
A. CONCERNS ABOUT CS-PSYCHOLOGY'S VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
1. CS-Psycbology is Not Always Valid. Many times it will be partially or
wholly incorrect. For example, CS-psychology may be susceptible to a variety of
cognitive and perceptual biases such as illusory correlation, availability, and
131representativeness.
2. CS-Psychology May Be Contradictory. Assumptions in CS-psychology
sometimes conflict with one another in whole or in part.
3. CS-Psychology is Not Always Reliable (Consistent). There may be multi-
ple, competing versions of the common wisdom regarding particular behavioral
or social phenomena, with CS-psychology varying among individuals and
cultures.
B. CONCERNS ABOUT CS-PSYCHOLOGY EMBODIED IN LAW
1. Which CS-Psychology? Courts may disagree about what constitutes CS-
psychology, as evidenced by split decisions and conflicting legal doctrines
between or even within jurisdictions.
2. Law's CS-Psychology May Conflict with True CS-Psycbology. Law may
conflict with CS-psychology when law represents only the values of the powerful
in society or popular prejudices, when law is just a convenient legal fiction
designed to support a particular legal result, or when law is simply out-of-date
or out-of-step with prevailing community sentiment. To the extent that the
judiciary is not diverse enough to represent sufficiently the views of the larger so-
ciety, the likelihood that law will be out-of-step with CS-psychology
increases.131
130. Parbam, 442 US at 602 (cited in note 57).
131. See Perlin, 69 Neb L Rev at 12-17 (cited in note 70).
132. See Paul L. Biderman, Of Vulcans and Values: Judicial Decision-Making and
Implications for Judicial Education, 47 Juv & Fain Ct J 61, 69, 78-79 (1996); Craig
Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the "Will of the
People," 3 Psychol Pub Pol & L 303, 309-10 (1997) ("Legal commonsense-the received
wisdom of the ages, at least as understood largely by judges and legislators who share
ethnicity, social class, educational background, and many other biographical and social-
historical similarities-is the view of the world that happens to have been enshrined in our
law . . . [which] privilege[s] one set of values and a particular view of the world over
others.")
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C. CONCERNS ABOUT USING CS-PSYCHOLOGY IN PSYCHOLEGAL ADVOCACY
1. CS-Psychology May Not Be Very Informative or Useful to Law. Since
psycholegal research is perhaps more informative when it challenges or contra-
dicts the law's status quo assumptions, lawyers and judges may have little use for
research that only confirms or better defines common knowledge.
2. Which Should Be Controlling When CS-Psychology and Scientific Re-
search Conflict? If a compelling body of psycholegal research conflicts with
equally compelling CS-psychology, which should control law and advocacy? Like
its scientific counterpart, CS-psychology is not without shortcomings; there are
not easy answers to the foregoing questions. The use of CS-psychology in
psycholegal research and advocacy, however, should improve the prospects for
psycholegal research to influence law.
The next Section provides recommendations for dealing with many of the
concerns about CS-psychology outlined above, including a research agenda for
assessing the validity and reliability of CS-psychology and guidelines for deciding
when to use research findings in advocacy and legal decision-making.
VIII. Implications of CS-Psychology for Psycholegal Research and
Advocacy
A CS-psychology approach to psycholegal research and advocacy implies an
expansion of the research and advocacy perspective, a research agenda and
methodologies to study CS-psychology, and perhaps a more measured and
restrained use of empirical social science in law.
A. A COMMON-SENSE PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE ON RESEARCH AND
ADVOCACY
1. Take CS-Psychology Seriously as a Legitimate Form of Empirical Knowl-
edge. The assumptions underlying law have much to offer us in explaining
human behavior.'33 While advocates of an empirically grounded jurisprudence
often use the phrase "social science in law,"'34 psycholegal researchers must
also use "law in social science." The law's "armchair inductions" do have an
empirical foundation, 3 ' and it is a mistake for psycholegal researchers to
ignore or minimize the value of law's CS-psychology because it is "normative"
rather than "scientific."' 36 Scientific psychology and CS-psychology are mutual-
133. See Monahan and Loftus, 33 Ann Rev Psychol 446 (cited in note 96).
134. See generally Melton, 14 L & Human Beh 315 (cited in note 25); Monahan and
Walker, 134 U Pa L Rev 477 (cited in note 20).
135. See Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 65 (cited in note 55).
136. See Howard, 46 Am Psychologist at 189 (cited in note 60) (arguing we should not
adopt the Enlightenment view "that scientific insights are superior to the humanities ...
The insights of scientific psychology and various humanistic disciplines both represent
refined insights into human nature that are of the same genus (i.e., storytelling), but are
of different species (i.e., science and the humanities).")
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ly complementary forms of empirical knowledge.1 3 1 "Common sense continual-
ly demands the responsible criticism of refined knowledge, and refined knowl-
edge sooner or later requires the security of common-sense support."
1 3 8
We should adopt a pluralistic methodology that integrates experience, the
non-empirical social sciences, and naturalistic research methods in addition to
traditional experimental methods.13 9 Although not commonly used in psycho-
logical research, historical analysis is a particularly important tool. In identifying
the antecedents and consequences of social phenomena, historical analysis
provides the context and time perspective needed for social understanding. An
excellent example is the scholarship of Heider, who drew on economics and
other social sciences in creating his influential work on the psychology of
interpersonal relations."' Increasingly, psychologists are recognizing the limita-
tions of scientific method and the potential of other knowledge sources and
methodologies for advancing our understanding of human behavior.'41 "Among
philosophers of science, everyone now seems to agree that the role of empirical
research in scientific progress was vastly overestimated by the logical positivists
of the previous generation." 42
137. For an argument that scientific methods often are arbitrary and that science and
law use equally arbitrary but similar methods of reasoning, see Michael Scriven, Methods
of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and Law, 23 J Leg Educ 189, 197-99
(1970). The rules of statistical significance provide a good example of the arbitrariness in
scientific discourse. See Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity
in Science and Public Life 211-12 (Princeton 1995); Sandra Scarr, Rules of Evidence: A
Larger Context for the Statistical Debate, 8 Psychological Sci 16 (1997).
138. Hammond, Human Judgment at 315 (cited in note 69) (quoting Pepper, World
Hypotheses 44-46).
139. See generally Donald T. Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 Am Psychologist
409 (1969); James G. Kelly, Changing Contexts in the Field of Community Psychology,
18 Am J Community Psychol 769, 776-80 (1990); Jean A. Linney and N. Dickon
Reppucci, Research Designs and Methods in Community Psychology, in Philip C. Kendall
and James N. Butcher, eds, Handbook of Research Methods in Clinical Psychology 535,
536-38 (Wiley 1982) (arguing that many issues of concern to the legal system "are
typically not within the realm of experimental control . . . for a variety of practical, legal,
political, and ethical reasons. In these areas community researchers need to rely on
alternative methods for research, that is, quasi-experimental models and descriptive,
naturalistic observation methods, naturally occurring changes or interventions such as
legislation and policy changes, and naturally occurring contrast groups."); Sarason, 30 Am
Psychologist 1072 (cited in note 80).
140. See Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (Wiley 1958).
141. See, for example, Slife and Williams, 52 Am Psychologist at 199-200 (cited in note
82) (suggesting qualitative methods may be better suited to the social sciences).
142. Andre Kukla, Nonempirical Issues in Psychology, 44 Am Psychologist 785 (1989).
See also Slife and Williams, 52 Am Psychologist at 120 (cited in note 82) (arguing that
"[p]ositivism's success in psychology is, at the very least, a matter of considerable
debate . . . there are few established laws to point to."). Some argue that the validity of
scientific method is shown by its success-that the proof is in the pudding. See, for
example, Paul E. Meehl, Credentialed Persons, Credentialed Knowledge, 4 Clin Psychol: Sci
& Practice 91, 96 (1997) (arguing that the debate over the validity of logical positivism
is a red herring, because what is relevant are the results-what reliably works versus what
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Scientific method may be insufficient for social understanding, which
"depends upon telling relevant stories ... deriving from past experience a nar-
rative which interprets the events as they unfold." '143 If the stories of CS-psy-
chology survive critical scrutiny for relevance and "truthfulness," they provide
data relevant to formulating public policy.' In fact, to ignore these stories by
excessively relying on scientific data is to "disregard reality," by "refus[ing] to
accept the plain evidence of one's senses" and the power of logical (deductive
and inductive) reasoning to discern reality.4 '
2. Use CS-Psychology as a Starting Point for Hypothesis Generation and
Theory Development in Psycholegal Research. CS-psychology should be the
starting point for theory development and hypothesis generation in psycholegal
research. Recall the research and advocacy on adolescent medico-legal decision-
making, for example, which failed to consider maturity factors relevant in
assessing the validity of law's assumption that adolescents lack mature judgment.
The research could not be generalized to real-world decision-making, it did not
influence law, and more recent research suggests there was wisdom in the law's
common-sense assumptions.
Importantly, because ethical, funding, or operational constraints often do not
allow researchers to investigate certain aspects of socio-legal problems, CS-
psychology can fill gaps in our knowledge. CS-psychology can be used successful-
ly as a source for hypotheses and theory development. For example, Weiner
recently developed a theory of responsibility that was based on studies of
people's opinions about when actors should be held responsible for their be-
havior.'46 Almost all of the results correlated with common sense, but the
"phenotypically diverse phenomena" were fit together to form a theoretical
framework that is informative well beyond CS-psychology.'47 Similarly, by
analyzing lay conceptions of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, Sternberg has
does not). But see Slife and Williams, 52 Am Psychologist at 120 (cited in note 82)
(arguing scientific method is itself a philosophy that cannot be validated by measuring its
own success) ("Just as those who wear old-fashioned boots cannot raise themselves into
the air by pulling on the straps of their boots, so scientific method cannot use its own
methods to validate the methods it is using.")
143. Martin Rein, Social Science and Public Policy 266 (Penguin 1976).
144. Id. Legal decision-making and effective legal advocacy often are based on a narra-
tive approach. See Olsen-Fulero and Fulero, 3 Psychol Pub Pol & L at 416 (cited in note
120) (citing research suggesting juror decision-making consists of creating a plausible
story); Gerry Spence, How to Argue and Win Every Time (Pan 1995) (arguing effective
legal arguments requires the skill of telling good stories). See also Howard, 46 Am
Psychologist at 188 (cited in note 60) (arguing that science is best understood as the pro-
cess of telling increasingly better theoretical stories, as is the case in storytelling in the
humanities).
145. Bauer, 7 Cato J at 34 (cited in note 113) (arguing that "preoccupation with
mathematical and quantitative methods has brought with it a regrettable atrophy of close
observation and simple reflection.")
146. See Weiner, Judgments of Responsibility (cited in note 129).
147. Id at 268.
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identified practical, real-world aspects of intelligence that had not been included
in existing psychological theories and tests. 48
But will research findings mirroring or explicating CS-psychology have any
cachet in legal advocacy and reform efforts? Do lawyers and judges have any
need for research findings which only confirm or better explicate common
knowledge? Given the storehouse of knowledge found in CS-psychology, psy-
chology may often be "a science that specializes not in discovery but rediscov-
ery.""' But this is not a shortcoming. On the contrary, psycholegal research
has a valuable role to play in identifying, defining, systematizing, quantifying,
and testing CS-psychology. Through explication and systematization, scientific
research can clarify and substantially enhance our understanding of "the pages
of human experience." "The level of detailed observation and assembly of
information necessary for developing integrative frameworks and precise quanti-
tative formulations is what sets the scientific-psychology enterprise apart from
everyday experience and enables scientific-psychology to begin with but then rise
above CS-psycbology."' Psycholegal research thus contributes to the "spiral"
of intellectual history,' the "recurrence of older conceptions but at a more
advanced level of complexity and sophistication. "152
Perhaps as psychology further matures as a science, it will increasingly reify
and refine the assumptions of CS-psychology.Y13 Science is now coming around
to accept some of the CS-psychology it initially dismissed. Consider the CS-psy-
chology principle that people "learn by imitation," which was apparently
debunked by Thorndike's experiments until later studies actually supported the
imitation principle." Consider also the ongoing debate in personality psychol-
148. Robert J. Sternberg, People's Conceptions of Intelligence, 41 J Personality & Soc
Psychol 37 (1981); Robert J. Sternberg, Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Creativity, and
Wisdom, 49 J Personality & Soc Psychol 607 (1985).
149. R.B. Joynson, Psychology and Common Sense at 34 (Routledge 1974). Consider
psychological principles of learning and memory, including extinction, levels of processing,
partial reinforcement, recency in free recall. Results of a multiple-choice test, written in
everyday language, showed that most lay people understand these principles. John P.
Houston, Psychology: A Closed System of Self-Evident Information?, 52 Psychological Rpts
203 (1983). These "results make a strong case for [the] conclusion that a great many of
psychology's basic principles are self-evident." Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 2 (cited in
note 54). Research on work motivation and job satisfaction also reflects simple common-
sense principles known to lay people. See P.A. Lamal, Psychology as Common Sense: The
Case of Findings Concerning Work Motivation and Satisfaction, 2 Psychol Sci 129 (1991).
Bandura's self-efficacy theory is reducible to the common-sense principles logically flowing
from everyday terms relating to personal effectiveness. Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 20
(cited in note 54) (citing J. Smedslund, Bandura's Theory of Self-Efficacy: A Set of
Common Sense Theorems, 19 Scand J Psychol 1 (1978)).
150. Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 16 (cited in note 54) (emphasis added).
151. See Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 151 (cited in note 28) (quoting R. Crutchfield
and David Krech, Some Guides to the Understanding of the History of Psychology, in Leo
Joseph Postman, ed, Psychology in the Making 3, 10 (Knopf 1962)).
152. Id.
153. See Billig, Rhetoric of Social Psychology (cited in note 111).
154. As Meehl says, "A lawyer in 1930 may have lost a cocktail party debate with an
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ogy as to whether individuals demonstrate trait-like consistency in their behavior
over time. There is a "sharp discrepancy between our intuitions, which tell us
that people do in fact display pervasive cross-situational consistencies in their
behavior, and the vast empirical literature which tells us that they do not. In-
tuitions or research? One of them must be wrong.'... Recent research suggests
that our intuitions may not be wrong after all: personality traits and gross-level
behaviors are consistent even though specific behaviors may not be. Once again,
CS-psychology acts as a springboard from which scientific psychology can work
to understand human behavior further.
B. AN AGENDA FOR PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH
1. Identify the CS-Psychology Inherent in Law. Psycholegal researchers and
advocates should, as a first step, identify the implicit and explicit psychological
assumptions underlying legal doctrine." 6 Since courts may explicitly disagree
about what constitutes CS-psychology, as evidenced in split decisions and
conflicting legal doctrines between or even within jurisdictions, it is important to
sample the range of CS-psychology in law. Researchers should consult generally
accepted legal doctrines and assumptions (such as those found in legal treatises
like the Restatements of Law) as well as the majority and minority rules across
jurisdictions. Once the range of CS-psychology has been defined, researchers can
construct a typology based on the commonalities and differences between the CS-
psychologies underlying a particular legal issue." 7
Implicit CS-psychology assumptions can be uncovered through a variety of
qualitative and archival research techniques and through interdisciplinary
research. Interviews and focus groups with lawyers and judges, ethnographic
research, and the analysis of judicial opinions, legislative histories, and treatises
can illuminate and make explicit the CS-psychology implicit in legal doctrine.
More generally, history, sociology, and political science can inform us about the
common assumptions of our culture and its laws. Historical and psychohistorical
analysis,5 8 providing insights from earlier generations,"s9 also is useful in
identifying psychological assumptions underlying law and the social context of
behavior.
animal psychologist, but the lawyer would have been closer to the truth." Meehl, 27 J Soc
Issues at 87 (cited in note 55).
155. Daryl J. Bern and Andrea Allen, On Predicting Some of the People Some of the
Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behavior, 81 Psychol Rev 506,
507-08 (1974) (emphasis added).
156. See, for example, Woolard, Reppucci, and Redding, 20 L & Human Beh at 225
(cited in note 5) (suggesting one goal for psycholegal research on children's capacities is
to identify the assumptions about children's development inherent in legal policies).
157. See the methods listed in subsection VIII.B.2.
158. See generally W.M. Runyon, Psychohistory and Political Psychology: A Comparative
Analysis (1993).
159. See Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of
History for Decision-Makers (Free 1986).
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2. Identify the Content and Structure of CS-Psychology and Assess Its
Validity. Once we have identified the CS-psychology implicit in law, we must
explicate it. What are its structure, definitions, principles, and parameters?
Consider the law's CS-psychology that adolescents are not mature decision-
makers. What is meant by "maturity?" What are its components? How do
people define "maturity" and what do they understand it to include and exclude?
The following is a brief analysis of a variety of specific methods that are useful
in analyzing the validity of a particular CS-psychology assumption underlying
law.
a) Opinion surveys are useful in identifying and defining the CS-psychology
implicit in legally relevant community standards and attitudes. Additionally,
people's self-reports about their behavior and their predictions or beliefs about
how people would respond in certain situations, also may reflect CS-psycholo-
gy.160 It is important, however, that surveys and questionnaires be constructed
with sufficient detail and psychometric validity to capture the subtleties and
variability in public opinion. Sensitive measures of public opinion call for using
multiple vignettes or questions and then aggregating responses.161 Otherwise,
surveys may give a misleading or oversimplified portrayal of CS-psychology. For
example, surveys asking in general terms how violent juvenile offenders should
be handled reveal the CS-psychology assumption that juveniles are psychological-
ly culpable for their crimes and should be punished like adults. 2 However,
surveys providing more specific information about the characteristics of the
offender reveal that CS-psychology is not so monolithic: juveniles having certain
characteristics are seen as culpable; juveniles having other characteristics are seen
as not culpable or less so.1 6 Similar discrepancies have been found between
people's general opinions about criminal sentencing and their judgments in
individual cases presented with unique facts and a variety of sentencing op-
tions.' 64
160. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 5 (cited in note 54).
161. See Shari S. Diamond and Jonathan D. Casper, Empirical Evidence and the Death
Penalty: Past and Future, 50 J Soc Issues 177, 190 (1994).
162. See, for example, Catherine A. Crosby, et al, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the
Eighth Amendment: An Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and Proportionality,
19 L & Human Beh 245 (1995); Norman Finkel, et aT, Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death
Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 Beh Sci & L 5 (1994).
163. See Loretta J. Stalans and Garth T. Henry, Societal Views of Justice for Ado-
lescents Accused of Murder: Inconsistency Between Community Sentiment and Automatic
Legislative Transfer, 18 L & Human Beh 675 (1994).
164. See Diamond and Casper, 50 J Soc Issues at 189-190 (cited in note 161); Kathlyn
Taylor Gaubatz, Crime in the Public Mind (Michigan 1995); P. Harris, Over-Simplification
and Error in Public Opinion Surveys on Capital Punishment, 3 Just Q 429, 433 (1986).
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b) Concept analysis and concept mapping"5 are useful methods in hypothe-
sis generation and theory construction.'66 They help identify the meaning of
CS-psychology concepts, how they are applied, the distinctions between concepts,
and the interrelationships between concepts and sub-concepts. Conceptual graph
analysis develops concept maps through a complementary analysis of documents,
open-ended interviews, structured interviews, and observation or induction.'67
Analysis of the causal networks and causal implications of CS-psychology can
reveal the causal connections and theorems implicit in CS-psychology.'68 Many
psychological theories really are "explications of conceptual relationships
imbedded in ordinary language (common sense)." '169 For example, Weiner
developed his responsibility attribution theory from a systematic and explicit
analysis of the causal network of CS-psychology concepts.'
c) Case studies, particularly systematic qualitative research based on multiple
case studies,' are useful in distilling general patterns of CS-psychology as well
as the conditions under which there are exceptions to the CS-psychology.
CS-psychology can be difficult to study because often it is implicit, "part of
the unconscious infrastructure of the mind."'7 2 Experimental methods used in
cognitive and personality psychology are useful for unpacking and explicating
CS-psychology.
d) Protocol analysis7 3 is useful for identifying and categorizing the CS-
psychology assumptions inherent in problem-solving or decision-making. It
involves making inferences about thought processes through the systematic analy-
sis of individuals' think-aloud verbalizations while solving a problem or perform-
ing a task.
165. See generally Shelby H. Evans and Donald F. Dansereau, Knowledge Maps as
Tools for Thinking and Communication, in Robert F. Mulcahy, Robert H. Short, and Jac
Andrews, eds, Enhancing Learning and Thinking 97 (Praeger 1991); Joseph D. Novak and
D. Bob Gowin, Learning How to Learn (Cambridge 1984).
166. See Garth J.O. Fletcher, Psychology and Common Sense, 39 Am Psychologist 203,
208 (1984).
167. See Sally E. Gordon and Richard T. Gill, Knowledge Acquisition with Question
Probes and Conceptual Graph Structures, in Thomas W. Lauer, Eileen Peacock, and Ar-
thur C. Graesser, eds, Questions and Information Systems 29 (Lawrence Erlbaum 1992).
The Ethnograph software can help identify common concepts from focus groups tran-
scripts. See, for example, Bonita F. Stanton, et al, Perceptions of Sexual Behavior Among
Urban Early Adolescents: Translating Theory Through Focus Groups, 13 J Early Adoles-
cence 44 (1993).
168. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 18-19 (cited in note 54).
169. Smedslund, 7 Theory & Psychol at 1 (cited in note 110).
170. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 21 (cited in note 54).
171. See Schneider, 53 Am Psychologist at 283-84 (cited in note 108).
172. Fletcher, 39 Am Psychologist at 212 (cited in note 166).
173. See generally K. Anders Ericcson and Herbert A. Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal
Reports as Data (MIT 1993).
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e) Prototype analysis" is useful for determining the horizontal and vertical
structure of a conceptual category. For example, Sternberg used prototype
analysis in his studies of lay conceptions of intelligence. 75
f) Psychological scaling 76 is useful for determining subtle and implicit
psychological distinctions among concepts and principles. It involves the analysis
of how people sort, recall, rate and rank concepts or principles. A matrix of
proximity values is derived from this data and then submitted to statistical
analyses to provide a spatial representation of conceptual distinctions and
interrelationships.
Before CS-psychology theorems are tested empirically they should be scruti-
nized like any scientific theory by examining their logical coherence and the
necessary truths they imply.'77 Then, ecologically appropriate validation re-
search is needed. 78
3. Identify When CS-Psycbology is Most Likely to be Valid and Reliable,
and Specify Where the Law Diverges from CS-Psychology. We should systemati-
cally assess and compare the validity of CS-psychology with that of scientific
psychology, to identify differences in validity and reliability between the taxo-
nomic levels of CS-psychology.179 Much more research is needed to develop
and validate taxonomies of CS-psychology. Fletcher identifies three general
categories of CS-psychology: shared fundamental assumptions about the world
that are universal across cultures, shared beliefs common to a culture, and a
shared way of thinking.8 ' Kelley also categorizes CS-psychology along three di-
mensions: level (macrolevel, mesolevel, and microlevel), familiarity, and personal
involvement.' Kelley argues persuasively that CS-psychology is most likely to
be valid (and extensive) at the middle (mesolevel) of generality, which is the most
commonly experienced and personally familiar. In contrast, CS-psychology tends
to be less valid concerning molecular aspects of behavior, events occurring over
long time spans, or group behavior."'
Additionally, because assumptions in CS-psychology often conflict (for
example, "birds of a feather flock together" versus "opposites attract"), we must
174. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 10-11 (cited in note 54).
175. See Sternberg, 41 J Personality & Soc Psychol 37 (cited in note 148).
176. See generally J.R. Olson and Kj. Biolsi, Techniques for Representing Expert
Knowledge, in K. Anders Ericcson and Jacqui Smith, eds, Toward a General Tbeory of
Expertise: Prospects and Limits (Cambridge 1992).
177. See Kukla, 44 Am Psychologist 785 (cited in note 142).
178. Compare Rosnow and Rosenthal, People Studying People at 72-73 (most research
studies use college students as participants) (cited in note 122).
179. See Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 93 (cited in note 55).
180. See Fletcher, 39 Am Psychologist at 204-07 (cited in note 166).
181. Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 6-7 (cited in note 54).
182. See also Meehl, 4 Clin Psychol: Sci & Practice at 94 (cited in note 142) (sug-
gesting we should be especially skeptical about knowledge gained from experience re-
garding "such things as large and variable time lag between allegedly correlated events,
frequency of spontaneous change, a long list of variables with different weights and
interactions, and inferred inner states and unobservable events such as past history.")
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identify the conditions under which each assumption holds and the interactions
between conditions."8 3 Importantly, we need to determine when legal assump-
tions run contrary to CS-psychology. Law may conflict with CS-psychology when
law represents only the values of the powerful in society,' when a convenient
legal fiction not reflective of veridical reality,18s or when dated or out-of-step
with prevailing community sentiment.'86
4. Identify the Circumstances Under Which Psychological Science Reverts to
CS-Psychology and Investigate How CS-Psychology Influences Behavior, Science,
and Law. We should examine the circumstances under which scientific psycholo-
gy has reverted to CS-psychology, when CS-psychology has ultimately debunked
psychology's counterintuitive findings. If there are certain domains or methodolo-
gies in psychology where this occurs more frequently,187 we may be able to
predict when a reversion to CS-psychology is most likely to occur. We should be
more circumspect about psycholegal research findings in circumstances where we
know that a certain methodology or subject matter may yield less valid findings
than CS-psychology.
It also is important to identify how and when CS-psychology influences our
behavior,"' our science,"' and our law. Because the way people think about
behavior affects behavior, and thus the law, we should be conscious of the effects
of both CS-psychology and scientific psychology.9 Legal change often occurs
through a process of natural selection whereby social and psychological forces
help determine which laws are litigated, challenged, and changed.""
183. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 15 (cited in note 54).
184. See Haney, 4 L & Human Beh at 194 (cited in note 19); Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J Leg Educ 505, 508
(1986).
185. Haney, 4 L & Human Beh at 194 (cited in note 19).
186. See, for example, Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the
Law (Harvard 1995) (demonstrating that law often conflicts with people's commonsense
views of justice); Id at 2 ("there is mounting and persuasive evidence that the 'law on the
books' may be at odds with commonsense justice, in many areas."). But see Haney, 3
Psychol Pub Pol & L at 305 (cited in note 70) (suggesting CS-psychology is intertwined
with law, each affecting the other).
187. See Meehl, 4 Clin Psychol: Sci & Practice at 93 (cited in note 142).
188. See Kenneth J. Gergen, The Saturated Self. Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary
Life 146 (Basic 1991) (asking how our constructions of reality influence our behavior and
perceptions).
189. CS-psychology has influenced scientific psychology, and vice versa, both for the
better and for the worse. See Kelley, 43 Ann Rev Psychol at 8-21 (cited in note 54).
Likewise, law often influences the course of scientific progress. See Mike Redmayne,
Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement, 30 UC Davis L Rev 1027, 1071-75 (1997)
(providing legal examples showing how litigation involving scientific issues prompts
additional scientific research and controversy).
190. Id.
191. See L.A. Kornhauser, Notes on the Logic of Legal Change, in David Braybrooke,
ed, Social Rules: Origin, Character, Logic, Change 169 (Westview 1996).
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH IN LAW
1. Unveil the Values Inherent in Psycholegal Research. Psycholegal research-
ers should head Judge Bazelon's clarion call to "unveil [their] values" and
"acknowledge the existence of alternative hypotheses and explanations"' 92
when deciding whether to disseminate research to the legal system. Had they
done so before advocating the position that adolescents are as competent as
adults to make medical treatment decisions, they might have been aware that
their values favoring adolescent autonomy may have blinded them to the highly
relevant issue of adolescent maturity.
The important role that values play in science is now widely acknowl-
edged.193 Psycholegal research and advocacy can never be a value-free endeavor
because the questions researchers ask, how they interpret their results, and the
methods they use are influenced by their values and worldviews.194 Like anyone
else, researchers are likely to interpret research results in a manner consistent
with their own socio-political beliefs.19 There is ample evidence showing the
influence socio-political values and cultural norms can have on scientific inqui-
ry.-'- For example, one study gave psychology undergraduates synopses of two
192. David L. Bazelon, Veils, Values, and Social Responsibility, 37 Am Psychologist 115,
119 (1982).
193. See generally George S. Howard, The Role of Values in the Science of Psychology,
40 Am Psychologist 255 (1985); Jasanoff, 77 Judicature at 77-78 (cited in note 27)
(discussing how science is socially constructed, contingent upon prevailing scientific conven-
tions, subjectively interpreted, and constricted by professional boundaries).
194. Scientists are by no means immune from being swayed by their own passions and
personal and political agendas. Michael Rein asserts:
The scientist is often saliently illogical in his work, particularly when he is defending
a preferred view or attacking a rival one; [i]n his experimental research, he is often
selective, expedient, and not immune to distorting the data; [t]he scientist is
probably the most passionate of the professionals; his theoretical and personal biases
often color his alleged "openness" to the data. . . . He is not the paragon of
humility or disinterest but is, instead, often a selfish, ambitious, and petulant
defender of personal recognition and territoriality; [f]ar from being a "suspender of
judgment," the scientist is often an impetuous truth spinner who rushes to hypothe-
ses and theories long before the data would warrant.
Rein, Social Science at 6 (cited in note 143). These assertions are supported by the
following observations of scientists at work:
A senior investigator insists that her assistants use theory X rather than theory Y
to interpret their findings. . . . Investigators demonstrate the weaknesses in theory
and method of all those who oppose their position, but do not admit their own
shortcomings. Investigators cite favorably those who were likely to review their work
for publication, hoping to increase the chances that their own work will be pub-
lished-that is, viewed as "accepted truth."
Gergen, The Saturated Self at 93 (cited in note 188) (citing Bruno Latour and Steve
Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Sage 1979)).
195. See generally Robert J. MacCoum, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research
Results, 19 Ann Rev Psychol 259 (1998) (reviewing studies showing bias).
196. See generally S. Begley, The Science Wars, Newsweek 54 (Apr 21, 1997); W. Her-
bert, Politics of Biology, US News & World Rpt 72 (Apr 21, 1997); Helen E. Longino,
Science As Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton 1990);
1998]
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studies on the deterrence effect of capital punishment and asked them to rate
each study's persuasiveness and methodological soundness. Those favoring
capital punishment rated higher the study finding a deterrence effect, whereas
those against capital punishment rated higher the study finding no deterrence
effect. 9 7 Also, scientific peer reviewers' judgments about the methodological
soundness and publishability of research has been found to vary significantly
according to whether the research matches the reviewers' own theoretical
perspective.' 98 A National Institute of Education study found that even the
results of statistical meta-analyses conducted on the same group of studies
differed according to the analyst's ideological orientation.'99 Scientists also tend
to overlook obvious and serious methodological flaws (for example, nonrandom
assignment to conditions, no control group) in studies where they perceived the
topic to be socially important, whereas they generally detect those flaws in
research they considered less important."'
Thus, since the same empirical data often can be used to support rival
positions,"' our "values organize [the] facts." 0 2 It is significant that
psycholegal researchers and advocates are (like most social scientists) over-
whelmingly politically liberal as a group,20 3 particularly in comparison with
Michael J. Mahoney, Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative (Ballinger 1976);
G. Mitman, The State of Nature: Ecology, Community, and American Social Thought
(Chicago 1992).
This is consistent with the postmodern view of science as subjective, cultural,
relativistic, and value-laden. See generally Bevan and Kessel, 49 Am Psychologist 505 (cited
in note 76); Kenneth J. Gergen, Exploring the Postmodern: Perils or Potentials?, 49 Am
Psychologist 412 (1994); Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences:
Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton 1992). Indeed, the view that scientists construct
scientific "facts" rather than discover them has been expressed by eminent social scientists
and philosophers of science. See, for example, Kenneth J. Gergen, The Social Constructivist
Movement in Modern Psychology, 40 Am Psychologist 255 (1985); Sandra Scarr, Con-
structing Psychology: Making Facts and Fables for Our Times, 40 Am Psychologist 499,
499 (1985); Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life (cited in note 194).
197. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J
Personality & Soc Psychol 2098 (1979). See also Redding and Reppucci, Effects (cited in
note 43) (reporting similar results in study with lawyers and judges).
198. Michael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmato-
ry Bias in the Peer Review System, 1 Cognitive Therapy & Res 161 (1977).
199. See N. Miller and V.E. Pollack, Meta-Analysis and Some Science-Compromising
Problems of Social Psychology, in William R. Shadish and Steve Fuller, eds, The Social
Psychology of Science 230, 251 (Guilford 1994) (describing study).
200. Timothy D. Wilson, et al, Scientists' Evaluations of Research: The Biasing Effects
of the Importance of the Topic, 4 Psychol Sci 322 (1993).
201. See, for example, Rosenblum, 2 Psychol Pub Pol & L at 624 (cited in note 13)
(questioning how law should handle variety of disparate findings and theories produced by
eminent social scientists on intelligence/vocational testing and discrimination law). See also
Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (cited in note 196) (arguing "history of science
repeatedly reveals that apparently inconsistent theories seem nevertheless adequately
supported by the data they are intended to explain").
202. Rein, Social Science at 266 (cited in note 143).
203. See MacCoum, 19 Ann Rev Psychol at 260 (cited in note 195); Richard E.
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lawyers, judges, and the law itself which is rooted so heavily in tradition and
precedent. Psycholegal advocacy of liberal socio-political policies often flows
more from social scientists' political views than from reliable scientific research
findings.2" One federal judge wrote that the opinions expressed by the expert
psychologist-witnesses in a school testing bias case were "more the result of a
doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scien-
tific inquiry.""' The survey studies cited in Brown v Board of Education,"6
for example, were later criticized for using a biased sample-surveying the
opinions of "liberal scientists studying race relations," thus ensuring that those
surveyed found segregation harmful.11
7
When psycholegal advocacy is based on socio-political values rather than
strong and directly relevant empirical data, it is not likely to be influential. This
may be another reason why psychologists' efforts to influence law have not been
more successful. "Judges may believe that the results of empirical research are
unreliable, because they have been distorted by the scientists' liberal values." 0 8
As Senator Hatch observed, "the findings of [social scientists'] research are now
almost perfectly predictable from their political views." 0 9
Redding, Toward Greater Political Diversity for the Science and Profession of Psychology
(unpub manuscript, on file with author); Philip E. Tetlock and Gregory Mitchell, Liberal
and Conservative Approach to Justice: Conflicting Psychological Portraits, in Barbara A.
Mellers and Jonathan Baron, eds, Psychological Perspectives on Justice: Theory and
Applications 234, 249-50 (Cambridge 1993) ("As a group, psychologists are
disproportionately (if not overwhelmingly) liberal and appear drawn to flattering portraits
of liberal and unflattering ones of conservatives. This intellectual attraction is understand-
able but has unfortunate consequences. Researchers have explored the empirical implica-
tions of some psycho-political portraits much more thoroughly than others.... What one
finds in psychological research often hinges on what one is looking for and how hard one
looks.")
204. See, for example, Richard E. Redding, Empirical Psychology Meets the Politics of
Family Values, 42 Contemp Psychol 1092 (1997). See generally Ellen Herman, The
Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (California
1995) (analyzing history of psychologists' influence on public policy and culture between
1945 and 1970, and finding that much of their work and advocacy was heavily influenced
by political ideology and that many social problems were unduly "psychologized" as a
result). See also Tana Dineen, Manufacturing Victims: What the Psychology Industry is
Doing to People (R. Davies 1996).
205. Pase v Hannon, 506 F Supp 831, 836 (N D III 1980).
206. 347 US 483 (1954).
207. Bersoff and Glass, 2 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 295 n 1 (cited in note 19).
208. Tanford, 66 Ind L J at 153 (cited in note 3). See also Richard E. Redding,
Relationships Between Lawyers' SocioPolitical Attitudes and Their Judgments of Social
Science in Legal Decision Making (unpublished doctoral dissertation, U Va 1987) (finding
that some judges perceive that social scientists' research and advocacy is driven by liberal
sociopolitical agendas).
209. Orrin G. Hatch, Psychology, Society, and Politics, 37 Am Psychologist 1031, 1036
(1982) (quoting R.A. Baron, The Spring of Our Discontent: Some Observations on the
Less-Than-Shocking View that Science and Politics Don't Mix, Newsletter, APA Div of
Developmental Psychol 28).
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Indeed, it is tempting and all too easy to advocate political views under the
veil of social science, with little more than the fact that there is "something
psychological to say about it."21 0 Deciding when research is ready for dis-
semination to the legal system is a judgment call21' (it can always be argued
that the research is incomplete)212 that should not be driven by researchers'
advocacy agenda. This was unfortunately the case in the American Psychological
Association's amicus briefs on adolescent abortion submitted in three Supreme
Court cases. 2"3 Though the studies cited in the briefs were all consistent in
showing that adolescents and adults are generally equivalent in their decision-
making capacities, the studies were insufficient in number, lacking in ecological
validity, and insufficiently relevant to warrant advocacy urging that the law was
incorrect in assuming that adolescents lack maturity to make adult decisions.2"4
Just as lawyers have a duty to inform the tribunal of controlling adverse
authority, psycholegal researchers and advocates have an ethical obligation to
fairly represent contrary research findings.2" ' Saks provides guidelines for en-
suring that legal briefs fairly present a body of research: the brief should provide
a survey of representative expert scientific opinion on the issue and/or provide a
meta-analysis (an analysis and statistical summation of the results in existing
research studies) of the research literature in the context of the theoretical alter-
natives supported by the data.21 6 Methodologies based on signal detection
theory and judgment analysis are available for identifying and separating inherent
value judgments from scientific judgments, as well as for integrating value
judgments with scientific findings to inform policy.217 Additionally, there are
methods for assessing the level of uncertainty inherent in a body of research find-
ings.
21
8
2. Do Not Base Law on Psycholegal Research Unless the Research is
Sizeable, Compelling, and Ecologically Valid, Particularly When Research
Findings Apparently Refute CS-Psychology. Psycholegal advocacy has been
210. Saks, Improving APA Science Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 L & Human Beh 235,
242 n 11 (1993).
211. See generally Lois A. Weithorn, Professional Responsibility in the Dissemination of
Psychological Research in Legal Contexts, in Melton, ed, Reforming 253 (cited in note 1).
212. See D.R. Fox, Social Science's Limited Role in Resolving Psycholegal Social Prob-
lems, 17 J Offender Rehab 159 (1991).
213. See Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, 44 Am Psychologist 895 (cited in note 92).
214. See id; Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 224-26 (cited in
note 92).
215. See Saks, 17 L & Human Beh at 239 n 5 (cited in note 210) (arguing that since
social science research evidence often functions much the same way as legal authority,
lawyers have ethical obligation to inform the tribunal of contrary research findings).
216. Id at 241.
217. See Kenneth R. Hammond, Lewis 0. Harvey, and Reid Hastie, Making Better Use
of Scientific Knowledge: Separating Truth from Justice, 3 Psychol Sci 80 (Mar 1992);
Kenneth R. Hammond and Leonard Adelman, Science, Values, and Human Judgment, 194
Science 389 (1976) (example of application).
218. See Peter Weiss, A New Way to Ask the Experts: Rating Radioactive Waste Risks,
274 Sci 913 (1993).
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criticized for relying on research that was insufficiently complete and reliable,
and/or politically biased, in a number of areas: for example, eyewitness reliabili-
ty, 19 battered woman syndrome, ' ' gender discrimination," gay and lesbian
parenting,' and adolescent competence.' The most famous examples are
Clark's doll studies used as evidence in the desegregation case of Brown v Board
of Education.'4 The studies have since been roundly criticized by social scien-
tists for their serious methodological flaws and probably invalid conclusions.2
Of course, the changing nature of science is not an indictment of research-based
advocacy; CS-psychology also changes over time, albeit less so. But there are real
risks in challenging CS-psychology too quickly and uncritically based on an
uncertain body of scientific research. These risks are particularly great for law
given the principle of stare decisis, which makes it difficult for law to change
with shifting research findings.
We should not urge the law to set aside long-held principles and assumptions
unless we are confident about the strength and ecological validity of the
psycholegal research upon which the advocacy is based. We should be circum-
spect about the ecological validity of research findings that conflict with CS-
psychology assumptions that "ring true," in cases where "[h]ardly anyone
entertains serious doubts about the [fireside] induction [and t]here is a consensus
of the fireside that cuts across demographic variables such as education, occupa-
tion, social class, religious belief, ethnic background, and the like.' 6 In other
words, we should hesitate to alter law's CS-psychology assumptions when they
are consistent with our own experience, 7 since "[tlhe plausibility of the con-
219. See Judith McKenna, Molly Treadway, and Michael E. McCloskey, Expert
Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability: Selling Psychology Before Its Time, in
Peter Suedfeld and Philip E. Tetlock, eds, Psychology and Social Policy 283 (Hemisphere
1992).
220. See David L. Faigman and AJ. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age
of Science, 39 Ariz L Rev. 67 (1997).
221. Gerald V. Barrett and Scott B. Morris, The American Psychological Association's
Amicus Curiae Brief in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The Values of Social Science Versus
the Values of Law, 17 L & Human Beh 201 (1993) (arguing that the American Psycho-
logical Association's amicus curiae brief presented a highly biased and misleading interpre-
tation of the scientific evidence on gender discrimination, because the brief selectively pre-
sented research findings, presented arguments not supported by the scientific literature,
failed to acknowledge contrary research findings, and presented inconclusive research
findings as conclusive). But see Susan T. Fiske, et al, What Constitutes a Scientific
Review?: A Majority Retort to Barrett and Morris, 17 L & Human Beh 217 (1993)
(refuting Barrett's and Morris's claims that the amicus brief was misleading).
222. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U Ill L Rev 833 (1997).
223. See Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, 44 Am Psychologist 895 (cited in note 92).
224. 347 US 483.
225. See Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 154 (cited in note 28).
226. Meehl, 27 J Soc Issues at 94 (cited in note 55).
227. See F.E. Goodson and G.A. Morgan, Evaluation of a Theory, in Melvin Herman
Marx and F.E. Goodson, eds, Theories in Contemporary Psychology 286 (MacMillan
1976).
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clusions is what counts." 228 Common sense and intuition serve as "warning sig-
nals" about the likely validity or invalidity of particular research findings and
policy arguments.
229
On the other hand, when sufficient in number, generally consistent in their
results, ecologically valid, and legally relevant, research findings generally should
prevail over the assumptions of CS-psychology.2 0 In these circumstances, legal
advocacy based on particular research findings is not only appropriate but highly
desirable.
IX. Conclusion
It has been said that law is "policy analysis without benefit of data."
23
'
Psychological science is in a position to change this state of affairs. The relation-
ship between psychology and law may be a "highly neurotic, conflict-ridden
ambivalent affair," 23 2 but psycholegal researchers and advocates can have an
impact on law if they consider CS-psychology as understood through "the pages
of human experience." Psycholegal researchers should use CS-psychology to
inform their research, and lawyers and judges relying on social science research
should evaluate it against the ecological context provided by the CS-psychology
inherent in law. To do otherwise ignores a fertile source of hypotheses and
knowledge about human behavior, and is perilous because the arbiters of law
(judges, juries, and legislatures) sympathize with the pages of human experience,
not with ANOVAs, correlations, and effect sizes. The former is its natural bed-
fellow; the latter, only an occasional mistress. Of course, we also should view
CS-psychology with healthy scientific skepticism.
We are well advised to heed Alfred North Whitehead's advice:
Science is rooted in ... commonsense thought. This is the datum from
which it starts, and to which it must recur. . . . You may polish up
common sense, you may contradict it in detail, you may surprise it. But
ultimately your whole task is to satisfy it.233
228. See Lee J. Cronbach, Designing Evaluations of Educational and Social Programs
(Jossey-Bass 1982). See, for example, Smedslund, 7 Theory & Psychol 529 (cited in note
110) (demonstrating some psychological theories and principles do not require empirical
proof, but are logically and necessarily self-evident).
229. Welch, 6 S Cal Interdisc L J at 68, 73 (cited in note 51).
230. Of course, scientific evidence is more likely to be admitted when a consensus exists
in the scientific community. See Rosenblum, 2 Psychol Pub Pol & L at 632 (cited in note
13). This is true notwithstanding the fact that Daubert does not require "general accep-
tance" for admissibility. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579, 589
(1993). One caveat is necessary: the adversary process may tend to portray greater con-
troversy in the scientific community than actually exists. See Jasanoff, 77 Judicature at 80
(cited in note 27).
231. Saks, 44 Am Psychologist at 1110 (cited in note 19).
232. Bersoff, 10 L & Human Beh at 155 (cited in note 28).
233. See Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Optimism 73 (Knopf 1990) (quoting Alfred N.
Whitehead).
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